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LEGAL PRACTICE AND CULTURAL 
DIVERSITY                                           
EDITED BY RALPH GRILLO, ROGER 
BALLARD, ALESSANDRO FERRARI, ANDRÉ 
J. HOEKEMA, MARCEL MAUSSEN, AND 
PRAKASH SHAH (2009) 
PASCALE FOURNIER & ANNA DEKKER∗ 
Barbara Johnson brilliantly proposed, in an essay on the contemporary 
rhetoric of reading, that the existence and production of binary relations 
suppose, on each part of the dualist difference, something like its opposite, 
which it hides.  She wrote: “Far from eliminating binary oppositions from 
the critical vocabulary, one can only show that binary difference does not 
function as one thinks it does and that certain subversions that seem to 
befall it in the critical narrative are logically prior to it and necessary in its 
very structure.”1  Legal Practice and Cultural Diversity subversively 
addresses and deconstructs one specific binary difference: the mutually 
constitutive relationship between the West and the East in the specific 
context of the (secular) reception of religious principles.  Such trajectory 
impacts the family and operates against the background rules of 
immigration, international and national human rights, and international 
private ordering. 
In their introduction, the editors note that the collection “brings together 
papers by anthropologists, political scientists and legal specialists who 
                                                          
∗ Pascale Fournier, Associate Professor, Vice-Dean of Research, Faculty of Law (Civil 
Law Section), University of Ottawa.  Anna Dekker, Research Associate, Faculty of 
Law, University of Ottawa. 
 1. See BARBARA JOHNSON, THE CRITICAL DIFFERENCE: ESSAYS IN THE 
CONTEMPORARY RHETORIC OF READING xi (1980) (providing that the deconstruction of 
a binary opposition is an attempt to follow the subtle, powerful effects of differences 
already at work within the illusion of a binary opposition). 
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consider how contemporary cultural and religious diversity challenges legal 
practice, how legal practice responds to that challenge, and how practice is 
changing in the encounter with the cultural diversity occasioned by large-
scale, post-war immigration.”2  The theme around which all the stellar cast 
of contributors rally could be summed up aptly in the turn of phrase that 
surfaces just once in the first few pages of the fascinating contribution from 
Professor Werner Menski: “navigating diversities,” a lesson Professor 
Menski compellingly urges us to learn through the historical and 
continuing example of India.3  After the editors’ two introductory chapters, 
which provide the theoretical background on cultural diversity, 
accommodation, and how global balances of power influence the 
“irreversible social fact” of minority populations,4 Professor Menski 
embarks on a detailed study of how India’s legal system has taken a 
“historically grounded, sophisticated approach to such questions of 
uniformity and diversity . . . so much more readily than Britain or other 
European countries, in order to account for difference.”5  He notes that 
“legal ‘perfection’ cannot ever be a permanent equilibrium; it is always an 
ideal state that needs to be constantly re-negotiated.”6  Although there is 
clearly no suggestion that India has attained this ideal state, India’s legal 
system does, in fact, present a “plurality conscious reconstruction . . . 
clearly marked by legal respect for cultural and religious diversity.”7  A 
state’s attempts to re-negotiate should not be a “superimposition of one 
particular type of dominant law, with reluctant pussyfooting over minority 
systems, but a newly navigated and negotiated legal construct that takes 
holistic account of the wider policy issues of the state as well as the needs 
of its different groups of people.”8  Professor Menski ends on a cautionary 
note, that those seeking to navigate through the eyes of legal storms 
brought about by cultural wind shear would do well to heed: 
Outright denial of the presence of ethnic minority laws and different sets 
of values, now part of the country’s super-diverse living history, looks 
not only dishonest . . . but increasingly dangerous.  It is also ignorantly 
unrealistic, because it refuses to accept the fact that law is everywhere 
                                                          
 2. Ralph Grillo et al., Introduction to LEGAL PRACTICE AND CULTURAL DIVERSITY 
1 (Ralph Grillo et al. eds., 2009). 
 3. Werner Menski, Indian Secular Pluralism and Its Relevance for Europe, in 
LEGAL PRACTICE AND CULTURAL DIVERSITY, supra note 2, at 31, 35. 
 4. Ralph Grillo et al., Cultural Diversity: Challenge and Accomodation, in LEGAL 
PRACTICE AND CULTURE DIVERSITY, supra note 2, at 25. 
 5. Menski, supra note 3, at 32. 
 6. Id. at 35. 
 7. Id. at 46. 
 8. Id. 
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more than state law.9 
“Re-negotiating,” however, has not always been the intuitive choice of 
Western legal players.  In this vein, Professor Menski makes an observation 
not directed at any particular nation or legal system, but one that echoes 
profoundly for many and, in fact, reverberates on various levels for several 
of the subsequent contributions to the book: secularism is not, as is 
simplistically generally accepted, the division of “church” and “state,” but  
rather the “equal treatment of all religions.”10  This, coupled with his 
reminder that “law is everywhere more than state law,”11 not only reveals 
the editors’ gift for ordering the contributions within the volume, but also 
the recurrent theme that, regardless of states’ legislative or policy choices, 
individuals will continue to live out the exigencies and pleasures of their 
cultures, whether juridical or otherwise, regardless of broader society’s 
formal recognition or acceptance. 
On the one hand, the former observation regarding the role of secularism 
is nowhere more apparent than in the chapters that touch on European 
examples, such as in the contributions that examine recent decades in 
France by Martine Cohen and Claire de Galembert.12  Two contributors, 
Claire de Galembert and Samantha Knights, specifically discuss the 
interpretation and application of Article 9 of the European Convention for 
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, which 
provides a right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion.13  This 
provision became central in the widely discussed cases of Muslim girls’ 
and women’s right to wear a veil in public places.  Ironically, both 
defenders and opponents of religious freedom and religious symbols have 
enlisted its aid in their ideological battles, particularly in the French vision 
of laïcité.14  The latter observation, on the other hand, underlies the studies 
                                                          
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. at 31. 
 11. Id. at 46. 
 12. See generally Martine Cohen, Jews and Muslims in France: Changing 
Responses to Cultural and Religious Diversity, in LEGAL PRACTICE AND CULTURAL 
DIVERSITY, supra note 2, at 219 (recounting the experiences of these groups during 
different periods: pre- and post-World War II, the 1970s, and the 1980s-2000s); Claire 
de Galembert, L’affaire du foulard in the Shadow of the Strasbourg Court: Article 9 
and the Public Career of the Veil in France, in LEGAL PRACTICE AND CULTURAL 
DIVERSITY, supra note 2, at 237 (outlining the transition of the veil/headscarf issue 
from mainly a French issue to an international one with implications for the European 
Union and United Nations). 
 13. See European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms art. 9, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, available at 
http://conventions.coe.int/treaty/en/treaties/html/005.htm (explaining that Article 9 also 
includes the right to change one’s religion or belief at any time and to manifest this 
belief in “worship, teaching, practice, and observance”). 
 14. See de Galembert, supra note 12, at 238-39 (highlighting parties on both sides 
of the debate as diverse as militant secularists and Islamic activists). 
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and insights provided by Mathias Rohe (Europe), Veit Bader (Canada), 
Prakash Shah (Britain), André Hoekema (Netherlands), and Jean-François 
Gaudreault-DesBiens (Québec, Canada). 
The issue of the informal existence (although not necessarily acceptance) 
of religious rules is a theme that reveals itself in many of the contributions.  
For example, Professor Shah notes the existence, in Britain, of “officially 
unregulated so-called ‘shari’a councils.’”15  Professor Hoekema’s 
observation is representative in this respect, although his chapter discusses 
the adaptation of norms and practices in the Dutch judiciary to changing 
(and ever-more diverse) cultural realities.  He uses the term “interlegality” 
to simultaneously describe both a process and an outcome: 
Interlegality should not be perceived as a form of interpenetration which 
can only come about when local law is recognized as such officially.  
Even when state law completely ignores local law or even actively 
cracks down on it, a process of intermingling of distinct legal orders will 
still be underway.  This directly suggests that, outside the world of 
official law, Islamic or Hindu or Adat institutions and the standard (often 
Christian) institutions do touch each other and mutually impact each 
other.16 
Rohe’s take is similar to Hoekema’s in that he recognizes the “informal” 
application of religious rules in daily life.17  In terms of the general 
adaptation (perhaps adoption) of such rules into the formal legal order, 
Rohe urges that debates be begun and followed in both parliament and 
society.18  Rohe focuses specifically on the shari’a system, which he 
cautions is not a “uniform Islamic legal system of substantive rules to be 
identified.”19  In the pitting of individuals’ rights against each other, he 
seems therefore to be urging at least a dialogue.  Within such dialogue, 
however, he is clear that there must be limits.  No avenue for influence, for 
example, should be given to extreme views—he uses one example of a 
Muslim author who advocates stoning and flogging women “in Germany 
(!) who are married to a non-Muslim[:]”20 
                                                          
 15. Prakash Shah, Transforming to Accommodate? Reflections on the Shari’a 
Debate in Britain, in LEGAL PRACTICE AND CULTURAL DIVERSITY, supra note 2, at 73, 
79. 
 16. André J. Hoekema, Does the Dutch Judiciary Pluralize Domestic Law?, in 
LEGAL PRACTICE AND CULTURAL DIVERSITY, supra note 2, at 177, 192. 
 17. See Mathias Rohe, Shari’a in a European Context, in LEGAL PRACTICE AND 
CULTURAL DIVERSITY, supra note 2, at 93, 95 (noting that most of the time, this 
application can be achieved without restriction). 
 18. See id. at 100 (advocating this process in light of changing convictions in 
Europe regarding, for example, family law and homosexuality). 
 19. Id. at 101. 
 20. See id. at 102 (explaining that the author justifies this extreme view on the logic 
that Muslims everywhere are subject to Islamic law and that the punishments should be 
carried out even when those affected are not aware of Islamic law’s applicability to 
4
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The danger of empowering such persons by opening ways for them to 
participate in legal life is obvious.  On the other hand, it is an important 
task for the state and its bodies to convince all parts of society again and 
again of the advantages of a secular, neutral legal order protecting human 
rights.  This includes the necessity to strengthen cultural sensitivity in 
administrations and courts.21 
The contributions of Veit Bader and Jean-François Gaudreault-DesBiens 
are in the minority in that they focus on North American trends.  
Gaudreault-DesBiens offers an excellent contextual analysis, rooted in a 
“tentative sociology,”22 for understanding the reasons behind Québec’s 
sometimes vehement opposition to religious symbols in public life.  
Gaudreault-DesBiens, himself a Québec resident, admonishes readers from 
resorting to the simplistic conclusion that “Quebeckers are fundamentally 
more intolerant of cultural diversity per se than their fellow Canadians.  
However, there is evidence that they are clearly less comfortable with 
religious claims . . . .”23  After a survey of Québec’s generally 
“monoreligious” (i.e., Roman Catholic) history which notes that Québec  
underwent a fundamental change during and since the 1960s to become 
Canada’s most secular province, Gaudreault-DesBiens eventually suggests 
that the reasonable accommodation debate has “revived old ghosts,” 
including “the fear of losing the French language and, with it, much of 
Québec’s historical identity.”24  The author rightly reminds us that this fear 
operates “in an English-speaking sea.”25  Given this peculiar historical and 
sociological location, a policy of “interculturalism” has recently been 
proposed in Québec, referring to “a process of reciprocal acculturation 
through contact and communication involving both the majority and the 
various minorities.”26  Ethically promising, this form of “open laïcité” 
situates itself somewhere in-between the strict model of separation of 
church and state à la française and the Canadian model of 
multiculturalism.  Drawing a more universal conclusion, Gaudreault-
DesBiens notes, “the Québec debate has shown that alleged majorities are 
                                                          
them). 
 21. Id. 
 22. Jean-François Gaudreault-DesBiens, Religious Challenges to the Secularized 
Identity of an Insecure Polity: A Tentative Sociology of Québec’s ‘Reasonable 
Accommodation’ Debate, in LEGAL PRACTICE AND CULTURAL DIVERSITY, supra note 2, 
at 151, 153. 
 23. Id. at 162. 
 24. Id. at 169. 
 25. Id. at 160. 
 26. Id. at 161 (explaining that this policy juxtaposes “multiculturalism,” which is 
prevalent in the rest of Canada and which the authors believe is not suited for a small 
region like Québec). 
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most vociferous when they realize that they are internally fissured.”27 
Veit Bader specifically examines Ontario’s relatively recent public 
debate about the role of shari’a arbitration.  He characterizes it as a missed 
opportunity for giving some of society’s most vulnerable individuals some 
real protections in the context of family disputes,28 and reiterates the now-
familiar danger of forcing women—who will be subject to informal 
practices regardless—to choose between their rights and culture.29  
Geographic distance, it seems, is no obstacle to common dilemmas.  Dalton 
McGuinty, premier of the Canadian province of Ontario, bluntly stated 
during a media interview in 2005 that “[t]here will be no shari’a law in 
Ontario . . . one law for all Ontarians.”30  While the Premier undoubtedly 
had political as well as legal motivations, he clearly fell into the trap that 
Prakash Shah identifies as made up of misguided, unrealistic, and 
erroneous assumptions about shari’a law.  First of all, Professor Shah 
points out that shari’a is misunderstood as a body of static legal or 
religious rules, mechanically applied, while it is actually “a system of 
identifying rules and then applying them to certain cases and situations.”31  
Islamic norms are “not necessarily considered to be valid and binding at 
every time and place, but are subject to interpretation whether and to which 
extent they have to be applied in time and space.”32  In many ways, then, it 
is not so very different from the statutory interpretation that takes place 
every day in Western common law courts.  But the message is even 
broader: all the authors who write about shari’a in various locations (e.g., 
Veit Bader, Mathias Rohe, Prakash Shah) emphasize the reality that state 
legal systems cannot keep shari’a out of people’s lives.  Informal systems 
govern people’s lives with as much—or even more—influence as formal 
ones. 
Another refreshing contribution to this volume is Natasha Bakht’s piece, 
which brings concrete, sometimes unexpected examples of how and where 
diversity struggles play out.  Exploring the possible need to accommodate 
niqab-wearing women in the courtroom, she uses the experiences and court 
records of cases that have encountered judicial (or other) obstacles for 
                                                          
 27. Id. at 171. 
 28. See Veit Bader, Legal Pluralism and Differentiated Morality: Shari’a in 
Ontario?, in LEGAL PRACTICE AND CULTURAL DIVERSITY, supra note 2, at 49, 60 
(characterizing these “most vulnerable” as exclusively Muslim women). 
 29. See id. at 67 (explaining that women who choose rights over culture can face 
the threat of social ostracism, which has both psychological and material costs). 
 30. Update: Canada: McGuinty Rejects Ontario’s Use of Shariah Law, 
WLUML.ORG, Sept. 12, 2005, http://www.wluml.org/node/88 (adding that Premier 
McGuinty also stated that religious arbitrations “threaten our common ground”). 
 31. Rohe, supra note 17, at 108. 
 32. Id. 
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women appearing in courtrooms, usually as witnesses.33  Professor Bakht 
forces us to question whether accommodation is necessary at all.  In the 
face of a significant (and growing) body of evidence about the limited 
usefulness of demeanour evidence for judges to make findings of fact, 
including credibility findings, Professor Bakht unmistakably concludes: 
“To force a choice between religious identity and participation in the 
justice system is to put women with already limited visibility in courts in an 
untenable situation.”34  In this, she repeats the now-resounding refrain that 
informal systems of law may prevail over their subjects, to the detriment of 
those who seek to find a way to live with both formal and informal 
systems.  Bakht’s thorough treatment of the topic, including an example of 
a New Zealand judge arriving at an “elegant compromise,”35 justifies and 
paves the way for what might otherwise be an insulting veiled accusation: 
“When opposition to Muslim women’s attire is irrational, one must ask 
what is really going on.”36 
The focus on Islamic law in the volume is perhaps what instigates 
Professor Gordon Woodman to point out, in the first paragraph of his study 
of how African customary laws are received within English legal culture, 
that his contribution is not about Islamic law, “which does not form a 
significant element in most sub-Saharan African states’ laws.”37  Tellingly, 
despite the distinct geographic focus, some of the same issues arise.  
Professor Woodman speaks of immigrants’ “double engagement”—most 
remain “effective members of their communities of origin” (such as 
through telephone calls, visits, and transfers of money) even as they 
become steeped in the culture and practices of their new home.38  Again, 
the element of cultural and legal choices, both formal and informal, 
emerges.  Also, like Professor Menski,39 Professor Woodman firmly, if 
gently, reminds us of the commonalities between African customary law 
and English common law.  In fact, “[i]t was assumed that the substantive 
                                                          
 33. See Natasha Bakht, Objection, Your Honor! Accommodating Niqab-Wearing 
Women in Courtrooms, in LEGAL PRACTICE AND CULTURAL DIVERSITY, supra note 2, 
at 115, 118. 
 34. See id. at 128 (concluding that since judges refuse to allow Muslim women to 
testify while wearing their niqab, many women are excluded from the judicial 
processes). 
 35. Id. at 130. 
 36. Id. at 132 (explaining that judges should be careful about the public impact of 
removing the niqab and look for alternative measures to accommodate Muslim 
women). 
 37. Gordon R. Woodman, The Challenge of African Customary Laws to English 
Legal Culture, in LEGAL PRACTICE AND CULTURAL DIVERSITY, supra note 2, at 135, 
135. 
 38. Id. at 136. 
 39. See id. at 142 (disagreeing with Menski’s argument that English law is 
unreceptive to the development of African customary law). 
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law was to be found in social practice.”40  The inevitable translation of this 
observation is that English common law was customary law and the role of 
customary law did not end there: “By the seventeenth century a general 
English common law had been established, but its doctrines included a 
principle that local customs were to be recognized and enforced, subject to 
conditions.”41  This trend continued during Britain’s period of colonial 
expansion, during which time “the British state showed itself willing to 
recognize the existing laws of colonized people, repeatedly providing that 
the colonial courts were to observe and enforce ‘native laws and 
customs.’”42 Professor Woodman gives examples of how customs have 
been recognized and accommodated in the British legal system—such as 
through the possible availability of a “cultural defence” in various criminal 
laws,43 a misnomer in that there is no such actual defence, but rather the 
possibility that aspects of an accused person’s culture “are sometimes held 
to be relevant facts in establishing guilt or innocence.”44  Professor 
Woodman is quick to point out, however, that “this is not recognition of a 
customary law.”45  Professor Woodman is far from urging a sweeping entry 
of customary laws into the British system but does encourage an informed 
understanding of it and how it can affect daily legal problems, noting that 
customary law practices have to be “fitted into the doctrinal structure of 
English law for recognition.”46  In the end, his aim is to avoid 
ethnocentrism while accepting that upholding “overriding principles of 
human rights, public order or public policy” will necessarily limit the legal 
system’s ability wholeheartedly to embrace cultural diversity and 
normative relativism.47 
Like Professor Woodman, Alison Dundes Renteln contemplates the 
influence of culture on legal practices, this time in the determination of 
damages in civil proceedings.  The issue in these cases “is that individuals 
may experience varying degrees of trauma when they are injured as a result 
of the misconduct of others.”48 For example, Renteln cites Bakhtiari v. 
                                                          
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. at 143. 
 43. See id. at 144 (explaining that culture defenses can be used where a defendant 
argued the norms of his culture “permitted, encouraged or required” him to commit 
such crime). 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. at 146. 
 47. Id. (suggesting that one should recognize African customary laws in light of the 
legal experience in England and Africa). 
 48. Alison Dundes Renteln, The Influence of Culture on the Determination of 
Damages: How Culture Relativism Affects the Analysis of Trauma, in LEGAL PRACTICE 
AND CULTURAL DIVERSITY, supra note 2, at 119, 215. 
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Zoological Society of London, in which a court ruled in favor of a larger 
damage award in the case of an Iranian girl who had three fingers bitten off 
by a chimpanzee.49  The court accepted that the social significance of the 
stigma of the missing fingers might affect her future marriage prospects.50  
Renteln points out that the law has admitted such things, such as through 
the thin-skulled rule and the principle that one must take a plaintiff as one 
finds her,51 thus the doctrinal door is potentially open to culturally-based 
arguments.  Given the likely increase in plaintiffs pleading the relevance of 
cultural factors (and a reciprocal rise in defendants pointing to such 
considerations), Renteln states, “governments would do well to devise 
policies appropriate for this analysis.”52  For her part, she offers a three-part 
“cultural defence test” designed to allow legitimate factors while avoiding 
fraudulent invocations of culture: (1) is the litigant a member of the ethnic 
group?; (2) does the group have the tradition claimed?; and (3) was the 
litigant influenced by the tradition when he or she acted?53 
The last word is reserved for Roger Ballard, whose anthropological 
insights lead to conclusions that have potentially significant repercussions 
for legal discussions.  His message is generally hopeful, partially because 
of his paraphrase of the maxim that there is nothing new under the sun.54  
In the context of cultural diversity and legal practice, it takes this form: 
“Our future, no less than our past, appears to be inescapably plural.” 55  In 
the end, he notes that “[t]he accommodation of plurality is likely to be less 
traumatic than the unilateralist champions of myopic universalism currently 
fear.”56  His offer of a more hopeful future than some imagine is founded, it 
seems, upon what amounts to a calling on our “better selves.”57  
Essentially, he implies that equity and justice will win out over legalism 
and ethnocentrism:  
In contexts of de facto plurality the imposition, indeed legal 
enforcement, of expectations of homogeneity and uniformity, even if 
implemented on nominally humanitarian grounds, will lead to many 
components of their everyday behaviour being identified as inappropriate 
                                                          
 49. See id. at 204 (citing Bakhtiari v. Zoological Soc’y of London (1991) Q.B. 
(Eng.)). 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. at 208. 
 52. Id. at 216. 
 53. See id. (suggesting that such a defense test can avoid potential abuse of cultural 
defences). 
 54. See Roger Ballard, Human Rights in Context of Ethnic Plurality: Always a 
Vehicle for Liberation, in LEGAL PRACTICE AND CULTURAL DIVERSITY, supra note 2, at 
299, 327. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. at 328. 
9
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at best, and as illegitimate, subversive or even criminal at worst.  Such a 
situation is in no way compatible with equity or justice.58 
In identifying and dismantling differences, Barbara Johnson suggested: 
“The starting point is often a binary difference that is subsequently shown 
to be an illusion created by the workings of differences much harder to pin 
down.  The differences between entities (prose and poetry, man and 
woman, literature and theory, guilt and innocence) are shown to be based 
on a repression of differences within entities, ways in which an entity 
differs from itself.”59  Legal Practice and Cultural Diversity not only 
presents the differences between the West and the East in the language of 
comparative law and society but reveals this repression of differences 
within both entities.  The viewpoints presented in this book are a welcome, 
thoughtful, and thought-provoking addition to—and change from—other 
media.  The contributions range from detailed close-ups, such as 
headscarves in French schools for de Galembert or constrained views of 
religious liberty in England and Wales for Sandberg, to broad 
foundations—Ballard’s somewhat cynical summary of the human rights 
discourse in international contexts which, according to him, “has been 
turned into a political football, with the result that it is often used to justify 
initiatives whose consequences (intended or not) are as likely to reinforce, 
rather than undermine, established patterns of inequality and injustice.”60  
While both cynicism and optimism rear their heads by turns, the more 
general sense in this volume is a healthy blend of the two: realism borne of 
observation not just of the present but also of historical trends. The papers 
in this volume offer an antidote to extreme views that have sometimes 
taken over debates about diversity and cultural accommodation. This is 
fitting indeed, for a volume that also purports to blend principle with 
practice. 
 
                                                          
 58. Id. at 325. 
 59. JOHNSON, supra note 1, at x. 
 60. Ballard, supra note 54, at 299-300. 
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